Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program
1998: The Year of Testing
By Carey Sublette
Background
The re-election of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to power in India in 1998 was a turning point in world affairs due to its decision to carry out India's first nuclear tests in 24 years. India had been poised on the brink of doing so for some years, with successive governments making active preparation to hold tests, going so far as to actually emplace nuclear devices in test shafts, and - under the first short-lived BJP government - to actually order that tests be conducted. Support for an open declaration of nuclear weapons status had become popular with the Indian public by 1995, and it was an official part of the BJP political platform. The successful execution of nuclear tests under the second BJP government was thus all but a foregone conclusion.
Like India, Pakistan had made many preparations for testing over the years, and could thus organize a test effort on short notice.
On 6 April 1998 Pakistan conducted its first test of the Ghauri. Pakistani media reports credited the missile with a 1100 km test flight and an apogee of 350 km, but information on the impact point shows that the flight distance was no more than 800 km. The system had a claimed range of 1500 km. While Pakistan has stated publicly that the missile was designed and produced indigenously it was, in fact, a North Korea produced No-dong. This was the second test of a No-dong, and it is believed that DPRK observers were present [Bermudez 1998a]. Although this test did not actually influence India's preparations for the tests held 5 weeks later, it did help create the atmosphere of tension in which the tests were conducted.
Ghauri, April 1998
In the afternoon of Monday, 11 May 1998 Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee stunned the world by announcing at a hurriedly convened press conference that earlier that day India had conducted three nuclear tests. International observers were, if anything, even more astonished by the announcement two days later that two additional tests had been conducted.
The Decision to Test
India's test created an untenable situation for Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif. In the wake of India's tests, Pakistan felt an urgent need to demonstrate its own prowess in a similar manner for many reasons - to deny India unilateral technical advantage it might have gained from conducting tests; to restore a sense of a balance-of-power with India in the eyes of itself, India, and the world; et cetera. Pressure for test spanned the political spectrum from liberals like opposition leader Benazir Bhutto to the religious right. Bhutto reportedly went so far as to declare that "if there is military capability to eliminate India's nuclear capacity, it should be used." Conservatives within the Sharif administration, particularly Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan pressed very hard for tests. And the Pakistani military, the true seat of power in Pakistan and the actual authority over its nuclear weapons, had been eager to conduct tests for years. Sharif thus faced unbearable pressure to authorize its own nuclear test series. It is very likely that had he refused to go along with tests, Sharif's government would have fallen to a military takeover then and there (rather than 17 months later).
Foreign Minister
Gohar Ayub Khan on
30 May 1998Despite the inevitability of the Pakistani response, it was a strategic disaster. Pakistan had suffered under the penalties of the Pressler Amendment for years. If Pakistan had abjured testing at this point, its status on the world stage would have climbed dramatically - as the "responsible" member of the India-Pakistan confrontation. The symbolic significance of turning the other cheek in the face of India's provocative testing would have made Pakistan the idol of proponents of non-proliferation, and likely would have led to the repeal of the Pressler Amendment sanctions. But by responding in kind, Pakistan not only lost all of these opportunities, it subjected itself to additional sanctions imposed in retaliation.
The day after the first tests Ayub Khan said the Asian subcontinent has been thrust into a nuclear arms race and indicated that Pakistan was ready to conduct a nuclear test of its own. "We are prepared to match India, we have the capability ... We in Pakistan will maintain a balance with India in all fields," he said n an interview. "We are in a headlong arms race on the subcontinent."
Prime Minister Sharif was much more subdued, refusing to say whether a test would be conducted in response: "We are watching the situation and we will take appropriate action with regard to our security," he said.
After returning to the country from a trip to Central Asia on 13 May Sharif met for several hours with senior military officials and senior members of his government to discuss India's action, which appeared to have taken Pakistan's security establishment by surprise. "We didn't have any advance information on these explosions," said a member of Sharif's cabinet.
Another cabinet member said, "Not surprisingly, many ministers thought it was the ideal moment for Pakistan to test its nuclear device," and Pakistan's army informed Sharif that it will be ready "within a week" to conduct an underground nuclear test on 24 hours' notice. But officials familiar the deliberations spoke of a division within the cabinet over an appropriate Pakistani response.
According to an aide, Sharif appeared to favor "a balanced and moderate response" and ordered a report on the cost the country would have to bear if a Pakistani nuclear test brought international sanctions.
The same day President Clinton telephone Sharif and urged him not to go ahead with a test, asking him "not to respond to an irresponsible act in kind."
[Azam 2000] provides an account of the initial cabinet meeting at which Pakistan's response to the Indian tests was considered:
1998: The Year of Testing
We know that Israel and South Africa have full nuclear capability -- a Christian, Jewish and Hindu civilization have this capability ... the Islamic civilization is without it, but the situation (is) about to change.
Deposed Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, from his jail cell, 1978"Dhamaka kar dein." (Conduct the explosion.)
Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif, 18 May 1998"Today, we have settled a score and have carried out five successful nuclear tests"
Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif, 28 May 1998Last changed 10 September 2001By Carey Sublette
Background
The re-election of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to power in India in 1998 was a turning point in world affairs due to its decision to carry out India's first nuclear tests in 24 years. India had been poised on the brink of doing so for some years, with successive governments making active preparation to hold tests, going so far as to actually emplace nuclear devices in test shafts, and - under the first short-lived BJP government - to actually order that tests be conducted. Support for an open declaration of nuclear weapons status had become popular with the Indian public by 1995, and it was an official part of the BJP political platform. The successful execution of nuclear tests under the second BJP government was thus all but a foregone conclusion.
Like India, Pakistan had made many preparations for testing over the years, and could thus organize a test effort on short notice.
On 6 April 1998 Pakistan conducted its first test of the Ghauri. Pakistani media reports credited the missile with a 1100 km test flight and an apogee of 350 km, but information on the impact point shows that the flight distance was no more than 800 km. The system had a claimed range of 1500 km. While Pakistan has stated publicly that the missile was designed and produced indigenously it was, in fact, a North Korea produced No-dong. This was the second test of a No-dong, and it is believed that DPRK observers were present [Bermudez 1998a]. Although this test did not actually influence India's preparations for the tests held 5 weeks later, it did help create the atmosphere of tension in which the tests were conducted.
Ghauri, April 1998
In the afternoon of Monday, 11 May 1998 Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee stunned the world by announcing at a hurriedly convened press conference that earlier that day India had conducted three nuclear tests. International observers were, if anything, even more astonished by the announcement two days later that two additional tests had been conducted.
The Decision to Test
India's test created an untenable situation for Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif. In the wake of India's tests, Pakistan felt an urgent need to demonstrate its own prowess in a similar manner for many reasons - to deny India unilateral technical advantage it might have gained from conducting tests; to restore a sense of a balance-of-power with India in the eyes of itself, India, and the world; et cetera. Pressure for test spanned the political spectrum from liberals like opposition leader Benazir Bhutto to the religious right. Bhutto reportedly went so far as to declare that "if there is military capability to eliminate India's nuclear capacity, it should be used." Conservatives within the Sharif administration, particularly Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan pressed very hard for tests. And the Pakistani military, the true seat of power in Pakistan and the actual authority over its nuclear weapons, had been eager to conduct tests for years. Sharif thus faced unbearable pressure to authorize its own nuclear test series. It is very likely that had he refused to go along with tests, Sharif's government would have fallen to a military takeover then and there (rather than 17 months later).
Gohar Ayub Khan on
30 May 1998Despite the inevitability of the Pakistani response, it was a strategic disaster. Pakistan had suffered under the penalties of the Pressler Amendment for years. If Pakistan had abjured testing at this point, its status on the world stage would have climbed dramatically - as the "responsible" member of the India-Pakistan confrontation. The symbolic significance of turning the other cheek in the face of India's provocative testing would have made Pakistan the idol of proponents of non-proliferation, and likely would have led to the repeal of the Pressler Amendment sanctions. But by responding in kind, Pakistan not only lost all of these opportunities, it subjected itself to additional sanctions imposed in retaliation.
The day after the first tests Ayub Khan said the Asian subcontinent has been thrust into a nuclear arms race and indicated that Pakistan was ready to conduct a nuclear test of its own. "We are prepared to match India, we have the capability ... We in Pakistan will maintain a balance with India in all fields," he said n an interview. "We are in a headlong arms race on the subcontinent."
Prime Minister Sharif was much more subdued, refusing to say whether a test would be conducted in response: "We are watching the situation and we will take appropriate action with regard to our security," he said.
After returning to the country from a trip to Central Asia on 13 May Sharif met for several hours with senior military officials and senior members of his government to discuss India's action, which appeared to have taken Pakistan's security establishment by surprise. "We didn't have any advance information on these explosions," said a member of Sharif's cabinet.
Another cabinet member said, "Not surprisingly, many ministers thought it was the ideal moment for Pakistan to test its nuclear device," and Pakistan's army informed Sharif that it will be ready "within a week" to conduct an underground nuclear test on 24 hours' notice. But officials familiar the deliberations spoke of a division within the cabinet over an appropriate Pakistani response.
According to an aide, Sharif appeared to favor "a balanced and moderate response" and ordered a report on the cost the country would have to bear if a Pakistani nuclear test brought international sanctions.
The same day President Clinton telephone Sharif and urged him not to go ahead with a test, asking him "not to respond to an irresponsible act in kind."
[Azam 2000] provides an account of the initial cabinet meeting at which Pakistan's response to the Indian tests was considered:
A meeting of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) was convened on the morning of 15 May 1998 at the Prime Minister’s Secretariat, Islamabad to discuss the situation arising out of the Indian nuclear tests. The meeting was chaired by the Prime Minister of Pakistan and attended by the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gohar Ayub Khan, the Minister of Finance & Economic Affairs, Sartaj Aziz, the Foreign Secretary, Shamshad Ahmed Khan and the three Chiefs of Staffs of the Army, Air Force and Navy, namely General Jehangir Karamat, Air Chief Marshal Pervaiz Mehdi Qureshi and Admiral Fasih Bokhari respectively.
Since Dr. Ishfaq Ahmed, Chairman of the PAEC was on a visit to the United States and Canada the responsibility of giving a technical assessment of the Indian nuclear tests and Pakistan’s preparedness to give a matching response to India fell on the shoulders of Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, Member (Technical), PAEC. Dr. Mubarakmand was in charge of the PAEC’s Directorate of Technical Development (DTD), one of the most secretive organizations in the Pakistan nuclear programme the location of which is one of Pakistan’s best kept secrets and unknown to the world. Dr. Mubarakmand had supervised several cold tests since 1983 and was responsible for overseeing all of PAEC’s classified projects. Also, in attendance was Dr. A.Q. Khan, Director of the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL), Kahuta.
There were two points on the DCC’s agenda: Firstly, whether or not Pakistan should carry out nuclear tests in order to respond to Indian’s nuclear tests? Secondly, if Pakistan does go ahead with the tests then which of the two organizations, PAEC or KRL, should carry out the tests?
The discussions went on for a few hours and encompassed the financial, diplomatic, military, strategic and national security concerns. Finance Minister Sartaj Aziz was the only person who opposed the tests on financial grounds due to the economic recession, the low foreign exchange reserves of the country and the effect of inevitable economic sanctions which would be imposed on Pakistan if it carried out the tests. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif neither opposed nor proposed the tests. The remainder spoke in favour of conducting the tests.
Dr. Mubarakmand gave a technical assessment on behalf of the PAEC of India's tests. Unsurprisingly, given the outside skepticism about India's test claims and India and Pakistan's mutual habit of denigrating each other's ability, his assessment was that there had been only one successful test on 11 May, and if a thermonuclear device had been fired then it had been a failure. Mubarakmand added that if it is decided that Pakistan should go ahead with nuclear tests of its own, then the PAEC is fully prepared to carry out the nuclear tests within 10 days.
Over the weekend Sharif consulted with various parties and factions, and remained under enormous pressure to test. Meanwhile public reaction continued to favor an immediate response. Former PM Benazir Bhutto advocated not only an immediate nuclear test by Pakistan, but also asserted that India should be disarmed by a preemptive attack, and called on Sharif to resign.
The tension was ratcheted up on Saturday by Ayub Khan, known to be a hard-liner with close ties to the military, when he remarked to reporters that a nuclear test by Pakistan "is just a matter of timing and the government of Pakistan will choose as to when to conduct the test." "A nuclear test by Pakistan is certain," he added.
Ayub Khan repeated the remarks the next day, telling The Associated Press that Pakistan has decided to go ahead with a test of a nuclear device. "It's a matter of when, not if, Pakistan will test," he said. "The decision has already been taken by Cabinet," he said in a telephone interview from his rural home in northwestern Pakistan.
The frenzy of speculation reached a peak on Sunday, 17 May, when the nuclear device was believed to be in place for a test. There was even a brief flurry of excitement caused by a false alarm on Sunday when German President Helmut Kohl said he had "reliable information" saying Pakistan had exploded a bomb, a report that was quickly denied and discredited.
The Chairman of the PAEC, Dr. Ishfaq Ahmed, cut short a foreign trip and returned to Pakistan on 16 May 1998. On the morning of 17 May 1998, he received a call from the Pakistan Army GHQ, Rawalpindi informing him to remain on stand-by for a meeting with the Prime Minister. He was thereafter summoned and, accompanied by Dr. Mubarakmand, met with Sharif at his official residence. Sharif asked the PAEC Chairman for his opinion on the two points which were discussed in the DCC meeting the day before. Ahmed assured the Prime Minister that the PAEC was ready to test when ordered to do so, but declined to take a position on whether the order should be given. At conclusion of the meeting he was told to prepare for the tests but remain on stand-by for the final decision
But PM Sharif did not confirm the comments by Ayub, and by the beginning of the next week, Pakistan appeared to have backed off any immediate decision to test, and was content to see how much in aid the US might offer in return.
But out of the public eye things were moving rapidly in a different direction.
Since Dr. Ishfaq Ahmed, Chairman of the PAEC was on a visit to the United States and Canada the responsibility of giving a technical assessment of the Indian nuclear tests and Pakistan’s preparedness to give a matching response to India fell on the shoulders of Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, Member (Technical), PAEC. Dr. Mubarakmand was in charge of the PAEC’s Directorate of Technical Development (DTD), one of the most secretive organizations in the Pakistan nuclear programme the location of which is one of Pakistan’s best kept secrets and unknown to the world. Dr. Mubarakmand had supervised several cold tests since 1983 and was responsible for overseeing all of PAEC’s classified projects. Also, in attendance was Dr. A.Q. Khan, Director of the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL), Kahuta.
There were two points on the DCC’s agenda: Firstly, whether or not Pakistan should carry out nuclear tests in order to respond to Indian’s nuclear tests? Secondly, if Pakistan does go ahead with the tests then which of the two organizations, PAEC or KRL, should carry out the tests?
The discussions went on for a few hours and encompassed the financial, diplomatic, military, strategic and national security concerns. Finance Minister Sartaj Aziz was the only person who opposed the tests on financial grounds due to the economic recession, the low foreign exchange reserves of the country and the effect of inevitable economic sanctions which would be imposed on Pakistan if it carried out the tests. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif neither opposed nor proposed the tests. The remainder spoke in favour of conducting the tests.
Dr. Mubarakmand gave a technical assessment on behalf of the PAEC of India's tests. Unsurprisingly, given the outside skepticism about India's test claims and India and Pakistan's mutual habit of denigrating each other's ability, his assessment was that there had been only one successful test on 11 May, and if a thermonuclear device had been fired then it had been a failure. Mubarakmand added that if it is decided that Pakistan should go ahead with nuclear tests of its own, then the PAEC is fully prepared to carry out the nuclear tests within 10 days.
Dr. A.Q. Khan, speaking on behalf of KRL, also asserted that KRL was fully prepared and capable of carrying out nuclear tests within 10 days if the orders are given by the DCC. Dr. Khan reminded the DCC that it was KRL which first enriched uranium, converted it into metal, machined it into semi-spheres of metal and designed their own atomic bomb and carried out cold tests on their own. All this was achieved without any help from PAEC. He said that KRL was fully independent in the nuclear field. Dr. Khan went on to say that since it was KRL which first made inroads into the nuclear field for Pakistan, it should be given the honour of carrying out Pakistan’s first nuclear tests and it would feel let down if it wasn't conferred the privilege of doing so.
Thus, both the PAEC and KRL were equal to the task. However, PAEC had two additional advantages which KRL didn’t. Firstly, it was PAEC which had constructed Pakistan’s nuclear test site at Chagai, Baluchistan. Secondly, PAEC had greater experience in conducting cold tests than KRL.
The DCC meeting concluded without any resolution of the two agenda points.
By week's end American spy satellites had detected an influx of equipment at a previously prepared test site in the Chagai Hills in the desert of southwestern Baluchistan province, barely 50 km from the border with Iran, and the CIA was predicting that a test could occur as early as Sunday 17 May.Thus, both the PAEC and KRL were equal to the task. However, PAEC had two additional advantages which KRL didn’t. Firstly, it was PAEC which had constructed Pakistan’s nuclear test site at Chagai, Baluchistan. Secondly, PAEC had greater experience in conducting cold tests than KRL.
The DCC meeting concluded without any resolution of the two agenda points.
Over the weekend Sharif consulted with various parties and factions, and remained under enormous pressure to test. Meanwhile public reaction continued to favor an immediate response. Former PM Benazir Bhutto advocated not only an immediate nuclear test by Pakistan, but also asserted that India should be disarmed by a preemptive attack, and called on Sharif to resign.
The tension was ratcheted up on Saturday by Ayub Khan, known to be a hard-liner with close ties to the military, when he remarked to reporters that a nuclear test by Pakistan "is just a matter of timing and the government of Pakistan will choose as to when to conduct the test." "A nuclear test by Pakistan is certain," he added.
Ayub Khan repeated the remarks the next day, telling The Associated Press that Pakistan has decided to go ahead with a test of a nuclear device. "It's a matter of when, not if, Pakistan will test," he said. "The decision has already been taken by Cabinet," he said in a telephone interview from his rural home in northwestern Pakistan.
The frenzy of speculation reached a peak on Sunday, 17 May, when the nuclear device was believed to be in place for a test. There was even a brief flurry of excitement caused by a false alarm on Sunday when German President Helmut Kohl said he had "reliable information" saying Pakistan had exploded a bomb, a report that was quickly denied and discredited.
The Chairman of the PAEC, Dr. Ishfaq Ahmed, cut short a foreign trip and returned to Pakistan on 16 May 1998. On the morning of 17 May 1998, he received a call from the Pakistan Army GHQ, Rawalpindi informing him to remain on stand-by for a meeting with the Prime Minister. He was thereafter summoned and, accompanied by Dr. Mubarakmand, met with Sharif at his official residence. Sharif asked the PAEC Chairman for his opinion on the two points which were discussed in the DCC meeting the day before. Ahmed assured the Prime Minister that the PAEC was ready to test when ordered to do so, but declined to take a position on whether the order should be given. At conclusion of the meeting he was told to prepare for the tests but remain on stand-by for the final decision
Since the DCC meeting of 15 May 1998 proved inconclusive, it is believed that a more exclusive DCC meeting was held on 16 or 17 May 1998 attended only by the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Finance Minister and the three Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Air Force and Navy. This meeting has never been officially acknowledged but it must have been held as neither the Prime Minister alone nor the Chief of the Army Staff alone could have made the decision to conduct the nuclear tests. The DCC was the only competent authority to decide on this matter, especially since the National Command Authority (NCA), Pakistan’s nuclear command and control authority for its strategic forces, did not exist at that time. In this meeting, the two agenda points of the DCC meeting of 15 May 1998 were decided. Firstly, Pakistan would give a matching and befitting response to India by conducting nuclear tests of its own. Secondly, the task would be assigned to the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), who were the best equipped and most experienced to carry out the tests.
Meanwhile the US worked on putting together an incentive package to Pakistan to persuade it not to test. The repeal of the Pressler amendment that cut off military aid was offered, as was delivery of $600 million dollars worth of F-16 fighter-bombers that Pakistan had ordered and paid for but never received. Discussions also began on how much aid to offer Pakistan on top of these concessions. The automatic imposition of a nearly complete embargo like that imposed on India, but which much smaller Pakistan could hardly afford, provided the penalty side of the equation. But PM Sharif did not confirm the comments by Ayub, and by the beginning of the next week, Pakistan appeared to have backed off any immediate decision to test, and was content to see how much in aid the US might offer in return.
But out of the public eye things were moving rapidly in a different direction.
On 18 May 1998, the Chairman of the PAEC was again summoned to the Prime Minister House where he was relayed the decision of the DCC. "Dhamaka kar dein" (Conduct the explosion) were the exact words used by the Prime Minister to inform him of the Government’s decision to conduct the nuclear tests. The PAEC Chairman went back to his office and gave orders to his staff to prepare for the tests. Simultaneously, GHQ and Air Headquarters issued orders to the relevant quarters in 12 Corps, Quetta, the National Logistics Cell (NLC), the Army Aviation Corps and No. 6 (Air Transport Support) Squadron respectively to extend the necessary support to the PAEC in this regard. The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) also directed the national airline, PIA, to make available a Boeing 737 passenger aircraft at short notice for the ferrying of PAEC officials, scientists, engineers and technicians to Baluchistan.