The political deadlock over the transfer of power from the Martial Law administration to an elected government developed into full* fledged insurgency in East Pakistan in early 1971. The insurgency had India's full moral and material support from the outset. It was India's strategic aim to exploit Pakistan's predicament and the grow*ing discontent in the eastern wing to its own advantage, and cut Pakistan to size.
Major-General (Retd) Fazal Muqeem Khan in his book ‘Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership’ discusses in detail the sinister interest that India had in the events in East Pakistan and the covert help it provided to the Awami League with propaganda and money during the election campaign in 1970. Soon after the Pakistan Army launched an operation to restore normalcy, wide-spread unrest started in March 1971. The Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, herself moved a resolution in the two Houses of the Indian parliament assuring the people of East Pakistan of India's "whole-hearted support and sym*pathy". India also launched a well-planned propaganda offensive to mobilise public opinion at home and abroad, using the influx of refugees from East Pakistan into Indian areas and the alleged atroci*ties of Pakistani forces on the local population as the basis.
Mrs. Gandhi personally conducted an extensive diplomatic cam*paign and wrote to several heads of foreign governments urging them to pressurise Pakistan into arriving at an early resolution of the crisis in East Pakistan. Later, she visited several important world capitals to seek endorsement of her own position. On 9 August, 1971 India and the Soviet Union signed a 20-year Treaty of Peace/Friendship and Cooperation which assured India total political, diplomatic and mili*tary support of the Soviet Union.
According to the authors of ‘War and Secession’, during negotia*tions on the Indo-Soviet Treaty, the Indian interlocutors informed the Russians that they intended to use military force to "solve" the East Pakistani crisis. During a visit to Moscow in late September 1971, Mrs. Gandhi reportedly told the Russians quite explicitly that hostilities were likely to break out after the monsoons. By early November special shipments to India of military equipment by air were commenced by the Russians and "Moscow assumed a support*ive position towards New Delhi both publicly and privately on developments in South Asia up to and through the 1971 war".
India made the political decision as early as April 1971 to provide assistance to the irregulars of the Mukti Bahini who were operating frequently from bases across the border against the Pakistani forces. India was directly involved both in providing intensive training to volunteers of Mukti Bahini and in launching a campaign of sabotage against strategic facilities and installations such as power stations, communication systems and ships in Chittagong harbour. The score of Indian military involvement increased substantially in the first three weeks of November and Indian units began to become directly engaged in hitting targets in East Pakistan and withdrawing to Indian territory. From 21 November to 3 December, Indian forces moved into key strategic positions around the principal Pakistani defensive positions on or near the Indian border and the Indian army, supported by Mukti Bahini, established operational bases in East Pakistan in the east, west and north for an assault on Dacca. The Indians at this stage planned launching a ‘formal war’ on 6 December.
The success of Pakistan's counter-plans hinged largely on rein*forcements and resupply of the eastern theatre of war by sea which could only be accomplished by a strong Navy capable of breaking India's naval blockade. The possible effects of a blockade of Pakistan's sea ports by the Indian Navy had all along been vigorously brought to the notice of the Government. However, such a force had not been developed although plans for a two- flotilla Navy (one each based in the two wings) had been put up to the Government as early as 1949. The plans unfortunately had become victim of seemingly endless bureaucratic indifference and of vague concepts such as "the defence of East Pakistan lies in the West" and "a short, sharp war" which stood in the way of the Pakistan Navy's expansion and reorganisation from the early fifties. General Ayub Khan was one of the major exponents of such concepts.
After the 1965 war the Indian Navy underwent rapid expansion and modernisation. Indian naval plans were thoroughly revised after the chastening experience of the. bombardment of Dwarka by PN ships in 1965. Consequently, between 1965 and 1971 the Indian budget allocation for the Navy grew from Rs 35 crores to Rs 115 crores. The Indian Navy' s strength during the same period was more than doubled-from 16,000 to 40,000 men. The Indian Fleet was augmented by the addition of a submarine force and acquisition of six Osa missile boats from the Soviet Union. Likewise, the surface fleet and air arm were also strengthened.
The fighting capacity of the Pakistan Navy did not make compa*rable progress in the same period. The Navy continued to be accorded a lower priority, and the fleet was allowed to degenerate into a shrinking force quite incapable of taking on the task of providing protection to the sea lines of communication between the two wings. The addition of three Daphne class submarines to the fleet in the late sixties was the only redeeming feature. However, their limited endurance confined them to duties in the Arabian Sea. The Navy particularly lacked an air reconnaissance capability which was to prove a significant factor in the outcome of the 1971 war.
The existing war plans were revised in May 1970 after General Yahya had taken over. In March 1971 the plans were further updated, and became by and large the framework for naval operations in the 1971 War.
The mission of the Navy in the event of a war was visualised as a very limited one:
a. Seaward defence of the ports of Karachi, Chittagong and Chalna.
b. Limited protection of the shipping traffic from the Persian Gulf to West Pakistan.
The entire sea-going fleet (with the exception of the submarines), under the command of the Flotilla Commander, was required to maintain maritime superiority in waters of interest to West Pakistan. The submarines were under the direct control of NHQ. In the east only four gun boats were available for operations against the Indian carrier group in the Bay of Bengal when the war started. Thus the Indians enjoyed preponderance in the Bay.
As the crisis deepened, the shortfall in the Pakistan Navy's manpower and operational capacity could be clearly seen as a major limiting factor. The situation became critical when Bengali personnel belonging to East Pakistan had to be assigned duties which would not place the fighting capacity of the Navy in jeopardy, and the Service was depleted by over 30 per cent of its strength to all intents and purposes. The technical cadres were particularly adversely affected.
The glaring disparity in the relative strength of the Pakistan and Indian Navies on the eve of the war is apparent from the table below:
Type
India
Pakistan
Aircraft Carrier
Vikrant (ex Hercules)
-
Cruisers
Mysore (ex Nigeria)
Delhi (ex-Achilles)
Babur (ex Diadem)
Destroyers
3 (ex UK R Class)
5 (ex UK)
Frigates
14
2
Petya class anti-*submarine escorts
5
-
Osa class guided missile patrol boats
6
-
Submarines
4
4
Midget submarines
-
6 (50 Ton)
Minesweepers
8
8
Replenishment Tankers
2
1
Repair ship
1
-
Landing ships
2 (Polnocny class)
-
Keeping in view the state of the fleet, even in its limited Role the Pakistan Navy was confronted with serious handicaps. Firstly, there was the preponderant strength of the Indian Fleet to reckon with. Secondly, there was virtually no defence against a possible missile attack from India's Osa boats. Thirdly, heavy reliance had to be placed on air support which in fact was not available, and in any case identifying the Osa boats from the air at great height, especially at night, was an insurmountable proposition. It was envisaged that a conventional attack on Karachi harbour would draw the fleet out into deeper waters, making it vulnerable to interception by the enemy.
About three months before the actual outbreak of hostilities on 15 September 1971, NHQ issued an emergency directive to the fleet placing it at a high level of operational preparedness. This meant ensuring availability of the maximum number of fighting units and putting them on high alert to go to war. The dockyard at Karachi was called upon to provide round-the-clock refit/repair facility and mobile repair parties were detailed to provide on-the-spot repair service to ships in anchorages outside Karachi harbour. The floating dock was positioned outside Karachi to ensure availability of alternative repair facilities.
On the night of 20/21 November, Indian forces estimated at about 100,000 in strength, supported by tanks, advanced into East Pakistan at several salients. The Government of Pakistan issued a proclama*lian of state of emergency. The Pakistan Navy took on added precautions on 24 November, and the fleet came to the standby with instructions to avoid creating the impression of an aggressive posture, as directed by the Government. Harbour defence measures were advanced and the Pakistan Navy took over control of all merchant shipping. Sea traffic from the west was diverted to a safer route.
A critical element in the war at sea was the correct and timely deployment of the submarines. As tensions with India continued unabated, hostilities were inevitable. The Navy ordered the subma*rines to slip out of harbour quietly on various dates between 14 and 22 November. They were allocated patrol areas covering the west coast of India while Ghazi was despatched to the Bay of Bengal with the primary objective of locating the Indian aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, which was reported to be operating in that area. Interdiction of merchant shipping was, however, not permitted due to lack of Government approval for this form of warfare. It may be mentioned that the Indians suffered no such inhibitions.
On 27 November, NHQ instructed FOFPAK (Rear Admiral MAK Lodi) to supplement the patrol undertaken by the minesweepers. The minesweepers were employed on an inner patrol and destroyers on an outer patrol. The object of the outer and inner patrols was to provide early warning of an enemy attack developing towards Karachi, and to enable the fleet to make a timely interception. It was mistakenly thought that a missile attack would be neutralised by the P AF. At one stage commanding officers of ships of the flotilla expressed the view that greater emphasis should be placed on the possibility of a missile attack, and the concept of inner and outer patrols was abandoned. This was subsequently reinstituted.
A plan for a counter-offensive in the West was presented to the President of Pakistan on 30 November, 1971 and the high command decided to initiate military operations in the West on 3 December, 1971. Pre-emptive strikes were carried out by the PAF at several Indian air bases along the western border and on 3 December 1971, Pakistan Army units launched operations in Poonch and Chhamb sectors with the objective of capturing important tactical features.
The overall objective of Pakistan's offensive plan in the West was threefold:
a. Take pressure off the beleaguered Pakistani forces in the eastern theatre.
b. Occupy sufficient territory in the west for possible bargaining after cease-fire; and
c. Intensify diplomatic pressure on the UN to make a decisive move in view of the blatant Indian attack in East Pakistan.
NHQ announced the outbreak of the war at 1845 on 3 December through a general message which read as follows:
'War has broken out on all fronts. Assume immediate readiness for war'. This was followed by a second message from the C-in-C Pakistan Navy to all units which said:
'We must defend ourselves with all our might. For us in the Navy, the long- awaited hour has struck and as true 'mujahids' with full faith in Allah and the justice of our cause we must respond to the call of duty with courage and determination. We must give no quarter to the enemy. Seek him out and destroy him wherever he may be. I am confident that all officers, sailors and civilians of the Pakistan Navy will by their exemplary conduct and action add another glorious chapter to Pakistan's and Muslims’ history, of which our future generations will be justly proud. May Allah be with us all and give us His protection and guidance. Pakistan Zindabad. 031900E Dec.'
The war was an. Five minutes after the C-in-C's message, FOFPAK was ordered "execute Flotilla War Plan". At 2334 NHQ instructed FOFPAK to maintain inner and outer patrols, thus re*affirming earlier orders issued on 27 November.
The operational orders issued to the submarines confined them to attacks against warships only and interdiction of merchant ships was not permitted. The Indian naval units operated with no such inhibi*tion; they attacked and captured several merchant vessels. However, the important point was that the submarines were at their war stations on 3 December when open hostilities started, poised to attack Indian naval units.
The PN reconnaissance aircraft sighted a formation of eight enemy ships when the war had just started; but the naval observer, being unaware of war having started, made his contact report hours later after landing. Had the Pakistan Navy been consulted or at least informed in time, this enemy force would have been destroyed or seriously damaged by our submarines and PAF effort. The outcome of naval warfare would then have been completely different that just being able to draw equal blood.
On 3 December, 1971 most of the Pakistan Navy ships were operational. Babur (Commodore HH Ahmad) and Muhafiz (Lt Cdr MS Usmani) were at anchorage. Dacca (Captain SQ Raza) was at Manora anchorage for a 5-day maintenance period with dockyard hands on board. Shahjahan (Cdr ZU Chaudhry), Mujahid and Mahmood were in harbour preparing for passage to East Pakistan. The only other operational destroyer in harbour was Badr (Captain RM Sheikh).
Alamgir (Cdr IA Sirohey) was under repairs scheduled to be completed on 15 December, 1971 and Tughril was under refit. Two gun boats from Saudi Arabia, re-named Sadaqat (Lt A Qayoom) and Rafaqat, were at Karachi under the direct operational control of MHQ.
Khaibar (Cdr MN Malik) and Tippu Sultan (Cdr SKM Rizvi) were searching for MV Jhelum about 80 miles south-west of Karachi on a mission to escort her to Karachi. Jahangir (Cdr TK Khan) was on patrol about 60 miles south of Karachi. She had been tasked to assist Khaibar to locate MV Jhelum and was to resume patrol thereafter. Zulfiqar (Cdr SM Hussain) was an the inner patrol 30 miles south of Karachi.
Major-General (Retd) Fazal Muqeem Khan in his book ‘Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership’ discusses in detail the sinister interest that India had in the events in East Pakistan and the covert help it provided to the Awami League with propaganda and money during the election campaign in 1970. Soon after the Pakistan Army launched an operation to restore normalcy, wide-spread unrest started in March 1971. The Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, herself moved a resolution in the two Houses of the Indian parliament assuring the people of East Pakistan of India's "whole-hearted support and sym*pathy". India also launched a well-planned propaganda offensive to mobilise public opinion at home and abroad, using the influx of refugees from East Pakistan into Indian areas and the alleged atroci*ties of Pakistani forces on the local population as the basis.
Mrs. Gandhi personally conducted an extensive diplomatic cam*paign and wrote to several heads of foreign governments urging them to pressurise Pakistan into arriving at an early resolution of the crisis in East Pakistan. Later, she visited several important world capitals to seek endorsement of her own position. On 9 August, 1971 India and the Soviet Union signed a 20-year Treaty of Peace/Friendship and Cooperation which assured India total political, diplomatic and mili*tary support of the Soviet Union.
According to the authors of ‘War and Secession’, during negotia*tions on the Indo-Soviet Treaty, the Indian interlocutors informed the Russians that they intended to use military force to "solve" the East Pakistani crisis. During a visit to Moscow in late September 1971, Mrs. Gandhi reportedly told the Russians quite explicitly that hostilities were likely to break out after the monsoons. By early November special shipments to India of military equipment by air were commenced by the Russians and "Moscow assumed a support*ive position towards New Delhi both publicly and privately on developments in South Asia up to and through the 1971 war".
India made the political decision as early as April 1971 to provide assistance to the irregulars of the Mukti Bahini who were operating frequently from bases across the border against the Pakistani forces. India was directly involved both in providing intensive training to volunteers of Mukti Bahini and in launching a campaign of sabotage against strategic facilities and installations such as power stations, communication systems and ships in Chittagong harbour. The score of Indian military involvement increased substantially in the first three weeks of November and Indian units began to become directly engaged in hitting targets in East Pakistan and withdrawing to Indian territory. From 21 November to 3 December, Indian forces moved into key strategic positions around the principal Pakistani defensive positions on or near the Indian border and the Indian army, supported by Mukti Bahini, established operational bases in East Pakistan in the east, west and north for an assault on Dacca. The Indians at this stage planned launching a ‘formal war’ on 6 December.
The success of Pakistan's counter-plans hinged largely on rein*forcements and resupply of the eastern theatre of war by sea which could only be accomplished by a strong Navy capable of breaking India's naval blockade. The possible effects of a blockade of Pakistan's sea ports by the Indian Navy had all along been vigorously brought to the notice of the Government. However, such a force had not been developed although plans for a two- flotilla Navy (one each based in the two wings) had been put up to the Government as early as 1949. The plans unfortunately had become victim of seemingly endless bureaucratic indifference and of vague concepts such as "the defence of East Pakistan lies in the West" and "a short, sharp war" which stood in the way of the Pakistan Navy's expansion and reorganisation from the early fifties. General Ayub Khan was one of the major exponents of such concepts.
After the 1965 war the Indian Navy underwent rapid expansion and modernisation. Indian naval plans were thoroughly revised after the chastening experience of the. bombardment of Dwarka by PN ships in 1965. Consequently, between 1965 and 1971 the Indian budget allocation for the Navy grew from Rs 35 crores to Rs 115 crores. The Indian Navy' s strength during the same period was more than doubled-from 16,000 to 40,000 men. The Indian Fleet was augmented by the addition of a submarine force and acquisition of six Osa missile boats from the Soviet Union. Likewise, the surface fleet and air arm were also strengthened.
The fighting capacity of the Pakistan Navy did not make compa*rable progress in the same period. The Navy continued to be accorded a lower priority, and the fleet was allowed to degenerate into a shrinking force quite incapable of taking on the task of providing protection to the sea lines of communication between the two wings. The addition of three Daphne class submarines to the fleet in the late sixties was the only redeeming feature. However, their limited endurance confined them to duties in the Arabian Sea. The Navy particularly lacked an air reconnaissance capability which was to prove a significant factor in the outcome of the 1971 war.
The existing war plans were revised in May 1970 after General Yahya had taken over. In March 1971 the plans were further updated, and became by and large the framework for naval operations in the 1971 War.
The mission of the Navy in the event of a war was visualised as a very limited one:
a. Seaward defence of the ports of Karachi, Chittagong and Chalna.
b. Limited protection of the shipping traffic from the Persian Gulf to West Pakistan.
The entire sea-going fleet (with the exception of the submarines), under the command of the Flotilla Commander, was required to maintain maritime superiority in waters of interest to West Pakistan. The submarines were under the direct control of NHQ. In the east only four gun boats were available for operations against the Indian carrier group in the Bay of Bengal when the war started. Thus the Indians enjoyed preponderance in the Bay.
As the crisis deepened, the shortfall in the Pakistan Navy's manpower and operational capacity could be clearly seen as a major limiting factor. The situation became critical when Bengali personnel belonging to East Pakistan had to be assigned duties which would not place the fighting capacity of the Navy in jeopardy, and the Service was depleted by over 30 per cent of its strength to all intents and purposes. The technical cadres were particularly adversely affected.
The glaring disparity in the relative strength of the Pakistan and Indian Navies on the eve of the war is apparent from the table below:
Type
India
Pakistan
Aircraft Carrier
Vikrant (ex Hercules)
-
Cruisers
Mysore (ex Nigeria)
Delhi (ex-Achilles)
Babur (ex Diadem)
Destroyers
3 (ex UK R Class)
5 (ex UK)
Frigates
14
2
Petya class anti-*submarine escorts
5
-
Osa class guided missile patrol boats
6
-
Submarines
4
4
Midget submarines
-
6 (50 Ton)
Minesweepers
8
8
Replenishment Tankers
2
1
Repair ship
1
-
Landing ships
2 (Polnocny class)
-
Keeping in view the state of the fleet, even in its limited Role the Pakistan Navy was confronted with serious handicaps. Firstly, there was the preponderant strength of the Indian Fleet to reckon with. Secondly, there was virtually no defence against a possible missile attack from India's Osa boats. Thirdly, heavy reliance had to be placed on air support which in fact was not available, and in any case identifying the Osa boats from the air at great height, especially at night, was an insurmountable proposition. It was envisaged that a conventional attack on Karachi harbour would draw the fleet out into deeper waters, making it vulnerable to interception by the enemy.
About three months before the actual outbreak of hostilities on 15 September 1971, NHQ issued an emergency directive to the fleet placing it at a high level of operational preparedness. This meant ensuring availability of the maximum number of fighting units and putting them on high alert to go to war. The dockyard at Karachi was called upon to provide round-the-clock refit/repair facility and mobile repair parties were detailed to provide on-the-spot repair service to ships in anchorages outside Karachi harbour. The floating dock was positioned outside Karachi to ensure availability of alternative repair facilities.
On the night of 20/21 November, Indian forces estimated at about 100,000 in strength, supported by tanks, advanced into East Pakistan at several salients. The Government of Pakistan issued a proclama*lian of state of emergency. The Pakistan Navy took on added precautions on 24 November, and the fleet came to the standby with instructions to avoid creating the impression of an aggressive posture, as directed by the Government. Harbour defence measures were advanced and the Pakistan Navy took over control of all merchant shipping. Sea traffic from the west was diverted to a safer route.
A critical element in the war at sea was the correct and timely deployment of the submarines. As tensions with India continued unabated, hostilities were inevitable. The Navy ordered the subma*rines to slip out of harbour quietly on various dates between 14 and 22 November. They were allocated patrol areas covering the west coast of India while Ghazi was despatched to the Bay of Bengal with the primary objective of locating the Indian aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, which was reported to be operating in that area. Interdiction of merchant shipping was, however, not permitted due to lack of Government approval for this form of warfare. It may be mentioned that the Indians suffered no such inhibitions.
On 27 November, NHQ instructed FOFPAK (Rear Admiral MAK Lodi) to supplement the patrol undertaken by the minesweepers. The minesweepers were employed on an inner patrol and destroyers on an outer patrol. The object of the outer and inner patrols was to provide early warning of an enemy attack developing towards Karachi, and to enable the fleet to make a timely interception. It was mistakenly thought that a missile attack would be neutralised by the P AF. At one stage commanding officers of ships of the flotilla expressed the view that greater emphasis should be placed on the possibility of a missile attack, and the concept of inner and outer patrols was abandoned. This was subsequently reinstituted.
A plan for a counter-offensive in the West was presented to the President of Pakistan on 30 November, 1971 and the high command decided to initiate military operations in the West on 3 December, 1971. Pre-emptive strikes were carried out by the PAF at several Indian air bases along the western border and on 3 December 1971, Pakistan Army units launched operations in Poonch and Chhamb sectors with the objective of capturing important tactical features.
The overall objective of Pakistan's offensive plan in the West was threefold:
a. Take pressure off the beleaguered Pakistani forces in the eastern theatre.
b. Occupy sufficient territory in the west for possible bargaining after cease-fire; and
c. Intensify diplomatic pressure on the UN to make a decisive move in view of the blatant Indian attack in East Pakistan.
NHQ announced the outbreak of the war at 1845 on 3 December through a general message which read as follows:
'War has broken out on all fronts. Assume immediate readiness for war'. This was followed by a second message from the C-in-C Pakistan Navy to all units which said:
'We must defend ourselves with all our might. For us in the Navy, the long- awaited hour has struck and as true 'mujahids' with full faith in Allah and the justice of our cause we must respond to the call of duty with courage and determination. We must give no quarter to the enemy. Seek him out and destroy him wherever he may be. I am confident that all officers, sailors and civilians of the Pakistan Navy will by their exemplary conduct and action add another glorious chapter to Pakistan's and Muslims’ history, of which our future generations will be justly proud. May Allah be with us all and give us His protection and guidance. Pakistan Zindabad. 031900E Dec.'
The war was an. Five minutes after the C-in-C's message, FOFPAK was ordered "execute Flotilla War Plan". At 2334 NHQ instructed FOFPAK to maintain inner and outer patrols, thus re*affirming earlier orders issued on 27 November.
The operational orders issued to the submarines confined them to attacks against warships only and interdiction of merchant ships was not permitted. The Indian naval units operated with no such inhibi*tion; they attacked and captured several merchant vessels. However, the important point was that the submarines were at their war stations on 3 December when open hostilities started, poised to attack Indian naval units.
The PN reconnaissance aircraft sighted a formation of eight enemy ships when the war had just started; but the naval observer, being unaware of war having started, made his contact report hours later after landing. Had the Pakistan Navy been consulted or at least informed in time, this enemy force would have been destroyed or seriously damaged by our submarines and PAF effort. The outcome of naval warfare would then have been completely different that just being able to draw equal blood.
On 3 December, 1971 most of the Pakistan Navy ships were operational. Babur (Commodore HH Ahmad) and Muhafiz (Lt Cdr MS Usmani) were at anchorage. Dacca (Captain SQ Raza) was at Manora anchorage for a 5-day maintenance period with dockyard hands on board. Shahjahan (Cdr ZU Chaudhry), Mujahid and Mahmood were in harbour preparing for passage to East Pakistan. The only other operational destroyer in harbour was Badr (Captain RM Sheikh).
Alamgir (Cdr IA Sirohey) was under repairs scheduled to be completed on 15 December, 1971 and Tughril was under refit. Two gun boats from Saudi Arabia, re-named Sadaqat (Lt A Qayoom) and Rafaqat, were at Karachi under the direct operational control of MHQ.
Khaibar (Cdr MN Malik) and Tippu Sultan (Cdr SKM Rizvi) were searching for MV Jhelum about 80 miles south-west of Karachi on a mission to escort her to Karachi. Jahangir (Cdr TK Khan) was on patrol about 60 miles south of Karachi. She had been tasked to assist Khaibar to locate MV Jhelum and was to resume patrol thereafter. Zulfiqar (Cdr SM Hussain) was an the inner patrol 30 miles south of Karachi.
