As already indicated earlier the Guides Infantry were warned to move in late April, 1948, to Kashmir. The battalion at this stage was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel G.A. MacNunn and it became obvious that it would be impossible for a British officer to command the battalion in Kashmir where defensive operations were impending. Thus this last British officer to command the Guides was posted away, much to his regret, and LieutenantColonel Karim Dad Khan joined the battalion in Kashmir.
Those readers who have visited Azad Kashmir recently will find it difficult to imagine the state of communications there in 1948. There were few roads and more often than not men were asked to carry their own stores, since mules were short. Therefore, the difficulties faced by Pakistani troops in 1948 when they were away from the Murree-Srinagar road can hardly be imagined at the present time. Initially the role of the Guides Infantry was a defensive one and they were split up all over the place. They were used to plug holes in the line as they occurred. For example, they had a company at Kolhala Bridge, a company at Muzaffarabad and Domel bridges and a company at Titwal. Battalion Headquarters were at Kohala where on May 8th, 1948 they were subjected to an Indian air raid.
On May 14th the battalion was ordered to move with two companies to the Uri sector on the right bank of the river Jhelum. They crossed the Jhelum with difficulty and later they had to re-cross it again as the brigade redeployed them to the west of the river Jhelum to hold the general line of Hattian and Chinari. At one stage the outlook for the battle in the Uri sector was so gloomy that the brigade issued a contingent plan for partisan warfare in case the line of defense in the Uri sector was overrun.
It will be remembered that a company (A Company ) had been moved to Titwal earlier and it immediately came into action against a large enemy force. Eventually the company had to fall back to Titwal itself and Richmar Gall. The withdrawal to this area was not without brave incidents by the platoon involved. In one case a large enemy force was ambushed and in another a Guides' platoon could only extricate itself by the use of bayonet.
It was decided about this time to send B Company, which was guarding the bridges in Muzaffarabad and Domel, also to Titwal and it reached there on June 1st, 1948. The second-in-command, Major A.A. Khaleeli, with a skeleton battalion headquarters was sent from the Uri sector to the Titwal sector to exercise command over B and C Companies.
Hardly had this composite force of two companies under Major Khaleeli concentrated when they were attacked by the Indians in the area of Chunj feature. This Chunj feature consists of three distinct heights, all about the same level, with point 7229 being nearest the bank of the Kishan Gathga River.
The battle for these three heights continued for a whole day, each side attacking and counter-attacking for one of the heights. Finally the Indians were pushed back to point 7229. Later in the day, this time coordinated with air and artillery, the Indians again attacked and regained the other two heights from which the gallant garrison of the Guides were pulled back owing to the shortage of ammunition.
It was decided however to recapture point 7229 at any cost. Though Battalion Headquarters and the other two companies had also arrived in the Titwal area the battalion as a whole was not used for this attack and only two companies again were launched on June 24th, 1948 for the capture of point 7229. The Indians meanwhile had developed their defenses considerably and laid down mines and booby traps. Hardly had A and D Companies advanced when they were held up in the minefield and the attack was called off.
The Guides Infantry were again in action in the Titwal area. By stealth, they surprised a large force and captured the most dominating feature of Pir Sahaba. This unhinged an enemy 'battalion size' force which defended this area. Later the Guides captured point 7802 as well. The whole of the battalion now was concentrated at Pir Sahaba and point 7802.
On July 20th B and C Companies, commanded by Major Aslam and Captain Sarwar, were ordered to attack Beari Ridge. The going was extremely difficult as in places they had to cross a knife-edge ridge where no more than a section could deploy. At the same time the advance was overlooked by the Indian position. By dawn on July 20th, 1948 the battalion closed up to the enemy bunkers after a night advance. However, here they were stopped by wire and a minefield and at the same time our artillery could not support the attack with full intensity since their ammunition was running low. Major Aslam had already been wounded and it was decided to call off the attack.
This in itself, as can be imagined, was a difficult proposition by day but was successfully and efficiently achieved. However the battalion suffered 40 casualties alone during this one operation. The battalion stayed at Pir Sahaba in close contact with the enemy until relieved. There were many brave patrol actions and exchange of artillery fire was normal.
The Guides' achievements during the Kashmir operations were highly commendable and were praised by the Division and the Brigade Commanders on various occasions. The battalion received eleven gallantry awards during these operations and was the first battalion that captured an Indian Sikh prisoner of war. Its exploits in these operations became legendary.
The following officers were present with the battalion during the Kashmir operations;
Lieutenant-Colonel Karim Dad Khan
Major A.A. Khaleeli
Major A. Rehman
Major A.A. Sheikh
Captain Khizar Hayat
Captain Mohammad Ali
Captain Abdul Majid
Captain Shahzada Khan
Captain Mohammad Sarwar
Captain K.M. Butt
Lieutenant Mohammad Igbal Khan
Lieutenant K.M. Kani
Lieutenant Mohammad Hamid
Those readers who have visited Azad Kashmir recently will find it difficult to imagine the state of communications there in 1948. There were few roads and more often than not men were asked to carry their own stores, since mules were short. Therefore, the difficulties faced by Pakistani troops in 1948 when they were away from the Murree-Srinagar road can hardly be imagined at the present time. Initially the role of the Guides Infantry was a defensive one and they were split up all over the place. They were used to plug holes in the line as they occurred. For example, they had a company at Kolhala Bridge, a company at Muzaffarabad and Domel bridges and a company at Titwal. Battalion Headquarters were at Kohala where on May 8th, 1948 they were subjected to an Indian air raid.
On May 14th the battalion was ordered to move with two companies to the Uri sector on the right bank of the river Jhelum. They crossed the Jhelum with difficulty and later they had to re-cross it again as the brigade redeployed them to the west of the river Jhelum to hold the general line of Hattian and Chinari. At one stage the outlook for the battle in the Uri sector was so gloomy that the brigade issued a contingent plan for partisan warfare in case the line of defense in the Uri sector was overrun.
It will be remembered that a company (A Company ) had been moved to Titwal earlier and it immediately came into action against a large enemy force. Eventually the company had to fall back to Titwal itself and Richmar Gall. The withdrawal to this area was not without brave incidents by the platoon involved. In one case a large enemy force was ambushed and in another a Guides' platoon could only extricate itself by the use of bayonet.
It was decided about this time to send B Company, which was guarding the bridges in Muzaffarabad and Domel, also to Titwal and it reached there on June 1st, 1948. The second-in-command, Major A.A. Khaleeli, with a skeleton battalion headquarters was sent from the Uri sector to the Titwal sector to exercise command over B and C Companies.
Hardly had this composite force of two companies under Major Khaleeli concentrated when they were attacked by the Indians in the area of Chunj feature. This Chunj feature consists of three distinct heights, all about the same level, with point 7229 being nearest the bank of the Kishan Gathga River.
The battle for these three heights continued for a whole day, each side attacking and counter-attacking for one of the heights. Finally the Indians were pushed back to point 7229. Later in the day, this time coordinated with air and artillery, the Indians again attacked and regained the other two heights from which the gallant garrison of the Guides were pulled back owing to the shortage of ammunition.
It was decided however to recapture point 7229 at any cost. Though Battalion Headquarters and the other two companies had also arrived in the Titwal area the battalion as a whole was not used for this attack and only two companies again were launched on June 24th, 1948 for the capture of point 7229. The Indians meanwhile had developed their defenses considerably and laid down mines and booby traps. Hardly had A and D Companies advanced when they were held up in the minefield and the attack was called off.
The Guides Infantry were again in action in the Titwal area. By stealth, they surprised a large force and captured the most dominating feature of Pir Sahaba. This unhinged an enemy 'battalion size' force which defended this area. Later the Guides captured point 7802 as well. The whole of the battalion now was concentrated at Pir Sahaba and point 7802.
On July 20th B and C Companies, commanded by Major Aslam and Captain Sarwar, were ordered to attack Beari Ridge. The going was extremely difficult as in places they had to cross a knife-edge ridge where no more than a section could deploy. At the same time the advance was overlooked by the Indian position. By dawn on July 20th, 1948 the battalion closed up to the enemy bunkers after a night advance. However, here they were stopped by wire and a minefield and at the same time our artillery could not support the attack with full intensity since their ammunition was running low. Major Aslam had already been wounded and it was decided to call off the attack.
This in itself, as can be imagined, was a difficult proposition by day but was successfully and efficiently achieved. However the battalion suffered 40 casualties alone during this one operation. The battalion stayed at Pir Sahaba in close contact with the enemy until relieved. There were many brave patrol actions and exchange of artillery fire was normal.
The Guides' achievements during the Kashmir operations were highly commendable and were praised by the Division and the Brigade Commanders on various occasions. The battalion received eleven gallantry awards during these operations and was the first battalion that captured an Indian Sikh prisoner of war. Its exploits in these operations became legendary.
The following officers were present with the battalion during the Kashmir operations;
Lieutenant-Colonel Karim Dad Khan
Major A.A. Khaleeli
Major A. Rehman
Major A.A. Sheikh
Captain Khizar Hayat
Captain Mohammad Ali
Captain Abdul Majid
Captain Shahzada Khan
Captain Mohammad Sarwar
Captain K.M. Butt
Lieutenant Mohammad Igbal Khan
Lieutenant K.M. Kani
Lieutenant Mohammad Hamid